Kant’s Categorical Imperative: Determining the Morality of a Decision

Kant’s Categorical Imperative: Determining the Morality of a Decision

Brandi Slavich

            Before Kant, the most valued moral theories were based mainly upon Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, which established that whatever leads to greater happiness is what is moral. Although Aristotle’s work was especially important to Kant, he was still dissatisfied with the popular moral philosophy of his day. Later, he derived his own requirements for a moral system to determine whether a particular act could be considered morally right, wrong, or somewhere beyond that domain. Based on the demands of the categorical imperative, which has three propositions of morality, this imperative was given as the criterion in which to judge all other principles.

Established on a basis of fairness and universalizability, Kant realized there cannot be one rule for him and another for everyone else. This guided him to the first principle of the categorical imperative, “an action must be done from a sense of duty, if it is to have moral worth” (The Moral Law 528). Under those circumstances he also omitted the actions which conform to duty, but have no direct impulse, however performing them because they are impelled to do so.  In layman’s terms, a person who is forced to act a certain way cannot be said to be doing so morally. Subsequent from the first, Kant derived a second principle, that an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire (Metaphysics of Morals 16).  Essentially, Kant is suggesting that an action is not moral if it is performed solely for the sake of its outcome.  To illustrate, a person who acts well simply because they believe they will be rewarded in the afterlife is not a moral person, whereas a person who acts well for the sake of acting well would be.

        With regards to the two proceeding propositions, Kant then formulated a third: “duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law. I may have inclination for an object as the effect of my proposed action, but I cannot have respect for it, just for this reason, that it is an effect and not an energy of will” (Metaphysics of Morals 16).  Whether in your own or in that of another, Kant derived that you should act in such a way that could be universal for all of humanity. From these three principles, Kant begins to summarize that: In [comprehending the possibility of a synthetic a priori moral law], we want first to inquire whether perhaps the mere concept of a categorical imperative may not also provide its formula containing the proposition that can alone be a categorical imperative . . . .

When I think of a categorical imperative, I know at once what it contains. For since the imperative contains, beyond the law, only the necessity that the maxim be in conformity with this law, while the law contains no condition to which it would be limited, nothing is left with which the maxim is to conform but the universality of a law as such; and this conformity alone is what the imperative properly represents as necessary. There is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative and it is this: Act only according to that maxim whereby you can concomitantly will that it should become a universal law (qtd. in Kitcher 555). This is almost a rational application of what is known as the “golden rule”—“do unto others as you would have others do unto you.”  Kant’s version is simply “act in such a way that it would be positive should everyone act the same.”

According to Kant, when the categorical imperative is not followed—when a person attempts to set a different standard for themselves than the rest of humanity—it is immoral. A person cannot decide whether demeanor is right or moral through empirical means, such assessment must be achieved a piori using pure reason. It is this manner of responding to human experience that makes Kant’s writings an important model for humanely progressive human rights thought and education. Far from being an unrealistic, overly optimistic idealist — as he is sometimes depicted — Kant, in the most enduringly valuable aspect of his criticism, had his eyes wide open and showed a responsibly inconclusive and righteously honorific attitude toward the dignity of a vulnerably divisible humanity. His attitude can be taken as exemplary for responsibly reflective human rights thought and education (Bynum 188).

Though there has been much debate, it seems there is a substantial presence that disagrees with Kant. Considering “to this day, no one has a clear and plausible account of how Kant’s argument for the formula of universal law is supposed to go” (Kitcher 555) some have deemed his thought process irrational, while others have said: Even specialists have fallen into confusion about these questions and have, as it were, begun to see ghosts in quarters where reason prevails: but, quite apart from this, the doctrine of a categorical imperative inherent in the will of man himself appears at present to meet with most unexpected and most unwanted repercussions in the common opinion, not merely of Germany, but almost of the whole world (Ebbinghaus 97).

Some philosophers take issue with the categorical imperative from a logical basis.  For example, Kitcher argues: Kant seems to think that L [conform your actions to universal law] is equivalent to FUL [formula of the law of nature]. He objects that L and FUL cannot be equivalent, because L carries no implications for any particular action, whereas FUL is meant to be (and is) action-guiding… Others have tried to figure out Kant’s reasoning in support of FUL, but verdicts reflect the current consensus that the quest for a solid argument is futile. There is considerable agreement on some of the key moves in the preliminaries to the focal argument (qtd. in Kitcher 556).

        Furthermore, the categorical imperative fails when trying to scale to large groups of people.  For instance, when making new laws, variance in the axioms of the lawmakers will cause the categorical imperative to break down.  For example, when it comes to abortion, one person may find the decision moral in certain circumstances on the basis that a zygote is not a person, whereas another would disagree.  Consequently, the two people would disagree over whether or not abortion is a moral decision when the categorical imperative is the tool used for the determination. That being the case, there are at least two sides to every story. From a functional perspective, with regard to an individual determining whether or not his or her actions are moral, Kant presented a well thought out imperative that can help a person determine whether or not an action is moral.  And its similarity to the golden rule, treat others the way you would like to be treated, is a testament to how prolific such a system of morality has been throughout history.

           

Resources

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Ebbinghaus, Julius. "Interpretation and Misinterpretation of the Categorical

     Imperative." The Philosophical Quarterly 4.15 (1954): 97-108. Print.

Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Lewis White

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Kant, Immanuel. "The Moral Law." Trans. T.K. Abbott. Ethics. Philosophy: The Quest for

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Kitcher, Patricia. "Kant’s Argument for the Categorical Imperative." Nous 38.4

     (2004):555-584. Print.